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A TALE OF THREE SOVEREIGNS: THE
NEBULOUS BOUNDARIES OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, NEW YORK STATE, AND THE
SENECA NATION OF INDIANS CONCERNING
STATE TAXATION OF INDIAN RESERVATION
CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS
Amanda M. Murphy*
This Note examines the conflict between New York State and the Seneca
Nation of Indians regarding the taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indians
on Indian reservations. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court found
New York’s taxation scheme facially permissible without providing
boundaries or guidance for the state’s subsequent enforcement. Seventeen
years after the Court’s decision, no taxes have been collected on these
sales.
The issue involves conflicting spheres of federal, state, and tribal control.
From 1965 to 1994, the Supreme Court balanced these competing interests,
creating precedent that has failed to provide a definitive solution to this
crisis. The Note examines the background of these decisions, the history of
the treaties between the Seneca tribe and the United States, and the shift in
federal Indian policy towards promoting a government-to-government
relationship between the United States government and Indian tribes.
Lastly, this Note proposes a solution modeled on the example of
Washington State. Facing a crisis analogous to that of New York,
Washington created a lasting solution to its taxation crisis by forging a
relationship of trust between the state, its agencies, and the Indian tribes.
This Note advocates that New York follow the same path and create
cigarette tax compacts between New York and the Indian tribes.
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INTRODUCTION
On the night of July 16, 1992, tires burned on the New York State
Thruway, located on a Seneca Indian 1 reservation thirty miles south of
Buffalo, New York. 2 Members of the Seneca Nation of Indians protested
New York State’s imposition of taxes on cigarettes sold to non-Indians on
reservation lands. 3 State troopers intervened, leading to a violent
confrontation resulting in injury to six people and the arrest of thirteen
protesters. 4

1. This Note uses the terms Indian and Native American interchangeably in accordance
with contemporary usage.
2. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
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Less than five years later, on April 21, 1997, the scene was repeated as
Seneca Indian protestors once again blockaded the New York State
Thruway on their tribal territory. 5 The State once again sent police in riot
gear and once again the confrontation resulted in injuries on both sides.6
Thirteen years after this encounter, on August 13, 2010, New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg issued the following instructions to Governor
David Paterson on how to collect taxes from Seneca tobacco sellers: “I
said, ‘You know, get yourself a cowboy hat and a shotgun’ . . . . If there’s
ever a great video, it’s you standing in the middle of the New York State
Thruway saying . . . ‘Read my lips—the law of the land is this, and we’re
going to enforce the law.’” 7
In response, the Seneca Nation held several rallies on its tribal territory in
upstate New York protesting the Mayor’s comments and the State’s
taxation efforts. 8 These rallies demonstrated the Senecas’ frustration with
what they perceived is the State’s infringement upon tribal sovereignty.9
The words of Tribal Councillor Travis Jimerson reflected the Nation’s
anger: “‘They never beat us. They never removed us . . . . We’re a nation
that’s never been beat. Many have tried, and they failed.’”10
In light of the ongoing conflict discussed above, it may be unsurprising to
learn the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue.
Indeed, in Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea
& Bros., Inc., 11 the Court found New York legislation taxing the sale of
cigarettes to non-Indians on reservations facially permissible in 1994.12
Almost seventeen years after this decision, however, the bitter conflict
between the Seneca Nation and New York State continues in the courts and
in the news. 13
From 1965 to 1994, the Supreme Court decided a line of cases
concerning the intersection between the sovereignty of Indian tribes, federal
regulation, and the interests of the states.14 Three important factors
compose the Court’s analysis in these cases. Part I of this Note explores all
three. The first component of this analysis is the development of the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty, discussed in the first section of Part I. 15
Tribal sovereignty, the autonomy of Indian tribes under American law,
provides the essential backdrop for discussing the blurry boundaries
5. See infra note 431 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 431 and accompanying text.
7. Adam Lisberg et al., Bloomberg Tells Paterson To Cowboy Up, Crack Down on
Senecas Selling Tax-Free Smokes on NY Thruway, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/08/13/2010-08-13_bloomberg_tells_paterson
_to_cowboy_up_crack_down_on_senecas_selling_taxfree_smok.html#ixzz10DEQetge.
8. Dan Herbeck & Aaron Besecker, State Relents After Ruling on Cigarette Tax,
BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article178397.ece.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part I.A–B.
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between the state’s power to regulate and the tribe’s freedom from such
regulation. Part I then discusses the relevant treaties made between the
federal government and the Senecas. 16 Such treaties also form the basis of
the rights of Indian tribes and provide the Senecas with an important means
of challenging New York’s taxation. Finally, Part I includes the third piece:
the modern shift in federal Indian policy that began with the New Deal.17
This policy, which aims to treat Indian tribes as equal partners in the
decision-making
process,
promotes
government-to-government
collaboration and respect between the federal government and the Indian
tribes.
Part II begins by describing the line of Supreme Court cases originating
with its 1965 decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission and culminating with Attea. 18 This part demonstrates the
Court’s reluctance to provide a bright-line boundary between the respective
realms of the state, the tribe, and the federal government, relying instead on
a tripartite, ad hoc balancing test. Part II continues to describe the
confusion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Attea, a conflict that
remains unresolved. 19 Part II then concludes with a discussion of the
successful efforts of Washington State to resolve a conflict analogous to
New York’s conflict. 20
Part III looks to these efforts in Washington as a guidepost for resolution
of the conflict in New York. 21 It proposes a solution based on the creation
of a tribal-state relationship of mutual respect. It further advocates for
government-to-government negotiations creating tribal cigarette tax
compacts similar to those employed in Washington to solve the crisis.
I. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: TRIBES, TREATIES, AND
TRANSFORMATION
This part introduces three historical pieces that form the background of
this issue. First it explains the development of tribal sovereignty in the first
years of the United States from the drafting of the Articles of Confederation
to the acts of the First Congress. 22 It then further traces this doctrine to the
Marshall trilogy, three seminal cases that established tribal sovereignty and
the basis of federal Indian law for over a century. 23 Part I.B explores the
Senecas’ treaties with the federal government, 24 specifically three treaties
made with the Senecas in the first years of American independence. 25 Part
I.B.4 discusses the struggle of the Seneca Indians against the attempts of
New York State and land speculators to move the tribes off of their
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A–II.B.
See infra Part II.B.1–2.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.A.1.
See infra Part I.A.2.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.1–3.
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ancestral homeland to the West. 26 It then describes the fraudulent treaty at
Buffalo Creek and the subsequent compromise treaty that reiterated the
federal government’s protection of the Seneca Indians from state
interference. 27 Finally, Part I.C describes the ideological transformation in
federal Indian policy that began with the Indian New Deal and was
cemented by the promotion of Indian self-determination in the 1960s and
1970s. 28
A. Tribal Sovereignty: The Essential Backdrop
This section outlines the development of tribal sovereignty. It begins
with an explanation of Indian regulation under the Articles of
Confederation and later the United States Constitution and the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790. 29 It then proceeds to describe the development of
tribal sovereignty in the three cases forming the Marshall trilogy, which
provide the essential backdrop to American Indian law. 30
1. Founding Foundations: From the Articles of Confederation to the Trade
and Intercourse Act of 1790
The British colonial system in the North American colonies generally
kept Native American tribes outside of society. 31 Neither as wealthy nor as
politically uniform as Spain, Britain managed its colonies through a more
decentralized model than its Spanish colonial neighbors. 32 Thus, the
British colonies in North America, which would become the future
American states, were accustomed to a great deal of autonomy. 33 Each
colony passed its own laws regarding Indian affairs.34 By the time of the
American Revolution, the British Crown dealt with treaties and land titles
outside its colonial territory while colonial legislatures handled Indian
trade. 35 Some of the most powerful tribes were those of the Iroquois or
Haudenosaunee Confederacy: the Onondagas, the Cayugas, the Oneidas,
the Mohawks, the Tuscaroras, and the Senecas. 36
Thus, the division of powers regarding Indian affairs formed an
important controversy at the drafting of the Articles of Confederation.37
Initially, the Framers drafted the document giving the federal government

26. See infra Part I.B.4.
27. See infra Part I.B.5–6.
28. See infra Part I.C.1–2.
29. See infra Part I.A.1.
30. See infra Part I.A.2.
31. See DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW 8 (2007).
32. See id. at 8–9.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 9; Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce
Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 219 (2007).
35. Natelson, supra note 34, at 219.
36. See Robert B. Porter, Legalizing, Decolonizing, and Modernizing New York State’s
Indian Law, 63 ALB. L. REV. 125, 128 (1999).
37. Natelson, supra note 34, at 225.
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the power to regulate Indian affairs exclusively. 38 This sparked debate
from states like Virginia and South Carolina, which argued that states
should possess these rights. 39 The final version of the Articles of
Confederation contained a vague compromise:
The united states in congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive
right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative
right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated . . . . 40

This provision neither defined the limits of state power nor the power of the
federal government. 41 Congress received exclusive jurisdiction over
transactions with Indians outside U.S. boundaries. 42 States received
exclusive jurisdiction over “Member-Indians,” Indians who were
“completely subject to state laws.” 43 Congress and the states had
concurrent jurisdiction over transactions with Indians within the United
States, but congressional action was still subject to state law.44
Thus, the young nation faced its Indian problems with little guidance
from the Articles of Confederation. Outstanding war debt crippled the
country, and popular unrest was a constant threat.45 A solution to this
rapidly escalating crisis was for Congress to sell western lands to liquidate
its domestic debt. 46 While this plan “might have worked if the region to the
west of the United States had been empty,” 47 several Indian tribes led by
the Mohawk diplomat Joseph Brant attempted to create an alliance to
threaten the interests of the Confederation Congress.48 The tribes claimed
Brant even traveled to London to rekindle their Revolutionary alliance with
Great Britain, a false rumor that nonetheless struck fear in many
Americans. 49 In addition, tribes in Georgia and North Carolina clashed
with the states over land claims, leading to unrest.50
In May 1787, the Constitutional Convention convened. 51 The serious
threat of an Indian war placed the regulation of Indian affairs on the agenda
of the Framers. 52 A summary of the Convention debates shows the
38. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 30
(2008).
39. Id.; Natelson, supra note 34, at 228 (describing South Carolina’s heavy involvement
in Indian trade regulation prior to the Revolution as the reason for its opposition to federal
control).
40. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
41. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 30–31.
42. Natelson, supra note 34, at 230.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See generally WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2007) (examining how popular movements and protests shaped the adoption
of the Constitution).
46. Id. at 137.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 137–38.
49. See id. at 137–40 (describing the entire feigned visit and its consequences).
50. Natelson, supra note 34, at 233.
51. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 31.
52. Id.
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delegates’ desire for the states to have subordinate but concurrent authority
in the sphere of Indian commerce. 53 The final product stated that Congress
has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . and with
the Indian Tribes.” 54 Whether the Framers intended the word “commerce”
to signify that congressional power was limited to Indian trade or should be
interpreted more broadly is the subject of scholarly debate.55
With its newly ratified constitutional mandate, Congress passed the
Trade and Intercourse Acts (1790 Act) to further regulate trade with Native
American tribes. 56 By delineating the boundaries between American
settlers and the tribes, Congress hoped to avoid costly Indian wars and
Indian alliances with European nations, like the partnership threatened by
Joseph Brant. 57 Congress also directed the Acts at states like New York
that claimed a superior right to control Indian trade. 58
The 1790 Act required a federally issued license for private individuals
who wished to engage in “any trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes.”59
Section 4 of the Act prohibited the conveyances of Indian land “unless the
same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the
authority of the United States.”60 Lastly, the Act mandated punishment for
Americans who commit crimes against Indian tribal members, even if such
activities are not themselves economic in nature or related to federal
treaties. 61 One-hundred seventy-five years after its passage, Justice Hugo
Black, writing for the Supreme Court in Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission, 62 cited the 1790 Act as the important beginning
of “comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders.”

53. See Natelson, supra note 34, at 235–41.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. Compare Natelson, supra note 34, at 241 (arguing this provision of the Constitution
did not grant exclusive power to Congress and the word “commerce” “meant that Congress
received power to govern in detail the trade carried on between citizens and tribal Natives
and those persons involved in that trade”), with Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court
and the Rule of Law: Case Studies in Indian Law, 55 FED. LAW. 26, 29 (2008) (arguing the
Framers intended Congress’s power over Indian affairs “to extend beyond mere
‘commerce’”), and Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than
One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1342 n.27 (1934) (“The exigencies of the time may have called
for a more complete system of regulating affairs with the Indians than of controlling
commerce among the states, but that does not prevent the latter phrase from having an
equally broad meaning when circumstances demand it.”).
56. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137.
57. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 44.
58. Porter, supra note 36, at 135.
59. Act of July 22, 1790, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 137.
60. Id. § 4.
61. Id. § 5. Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2010)
(arguing such a prohibition supports Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate
nontrade activities to protect its power to regulate Indian commerce), with Robert G.
Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin,
109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 59–60 (2010) (claiming the Indian Intercourse Act
is not an entirely accurate indicator of the original understanding of the Indian Commerce
Clause because it was an exercise of federal treaty power rather than commerce power).
62. 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965).

2308

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

2. The Marshall Trilogy
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall further developed
the boundaries between state and federal actions in the realm of Indian
affairs. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Court decided a
trio of cases: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 63 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 64 and
Worcester v. Georgia. 65 These cases, known as the “Marshall trilogy,”
serve as the earliest foundation of federal Indian law, forming the backdrop
against which modern issues affecting tribal sovereignty are analyzed. 66
In Johnson, the Court ruled that conveyances of land titles from tribal
Indians to non-Indian private individuals were not entitled to recognition by
Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal
the United States. 67
government possessed “an exclusive right to extinguish Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.” 68 When Great Britain
established colonies in the American territory, it gained “the exclusive right
of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.” 69 The
United States inherited the traditional rights of the European discoverer
when it signed the Treaty of Paris in 1783, ending the American
Revolutionary War. 70 This landmark ruling marked one of the first
important Supreme Court articulations about federal power over title to
Indian land.
In Cherokee Nation, the Court confronted one of the first cases in which
an Indian tribe was actively involved in challenging the policy of a state.71
There, the Cherokee nation sought to enjoin the State of Georgia from
implementing laws “which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the
Cherokee as a political society.” 72 Thus, the dispositive issue Chief Justice
Marshall addressed was whether the Cherokee tribe, as an allegedly foreign
63. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
64. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
65. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
66. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168–73 (1973);
Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592–
93 (2008) (citing the Marshall trilogy as the “template for analyzing and interpreting the law
in relation to disputes between the [federal, state, and tribal] sovereigns”); L. Scott Gould,
The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816
(1996) (noting the Marshall trilogy forms “[t]he conceptual underpinnings of and initial
limitations on” Indian sovereignty).
67. 21 U.S. at 587; see Gould, supra note 66, at 816.
68. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587. The Chief Justice’s analysis was strongly influenced by a
particularly English theory of customary law which submitted that “custom evidenced
ancient and lost legislative will.” Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v.
M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1098–
99 (2000).
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 584.
70. Id. at 584–85.
71. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 53.
72. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15. Georgia began enacting a series of legislative acts
beginning in 1827 which gave Georgia the ultimate title to Cherokee lands, forcing
dissolution of tribal autonomous governments and pressuring Indians to leave the state. See,
e.g., Act of Dec. 19, 1827, ch. 1, 1827 Ga. Laws 236 (asserting Georgia’s title to Cherokee
lands); ROSEN, supra note 31, at 39.
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nation, could invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between
foreign states and American states. 73 He began his analysis by stating that
“[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps,
unlike that of any other two people in existence.” 74 Rather than a foreign
state as intended by the Constitution, Marshall concluded that Indian tribes
“may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations.” 75 The relationship between the United States and Native
American tribes “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”76 Thus the
Court ruled that the Cherokee could not maintain an action invoking the
Court’s original jurisdiction, instead placing Indian tribes as the
beneficiaries of a trust relationship with the federal government. 77
The dispute between the Cherokee and Georgia continued in
Worcester. 78 Georgia charged plaintiff Samuel Worcester, a white
Christian missionary, with living “within the limits of the Cherokee nation
without a license” and without swearing his allegiance to Georgia and
Georgian law. 79 As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “The extra-territorial
power of every legislature being limited in its action to its own citizens or
subjects, the very passage of this act is an assertion of jurisdiction over the
Cherokee nation, and of the rights and powers consequent thereto.” 80 The
Court held that the Georgia law was an unconstitutional interference “with
the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation,
the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our
Constitution, is committed exclusively to the government of the Union.”81
In an opinion considered one of the most important in American Indian
jurisprudence, the Court held that Georgia impermissibly extended its laws
over Cherokee territory and refuted Georgia’s theoretical justifications for

73. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15–16; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all
Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”);
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except . . . between
a state and . . . aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.”).
74. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id.
77. Id. (“They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.”);
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 61 (noting Cherokee Nation “is generally considered to
be the origin of the trust relationship in Federal Indian Law, under which the federal
government is considered the trustee of Indian tribes”); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at
21 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I cannot but think there are strong reasons for doubting the
applicability of the epithet ‘state,’ to a people so low in the grade of organized society as our
Indian tribes most generally are.”).
78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832).
79. Id. at 528.
80. Id. at 516.
81. Id. at 520.
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such regulation. 82 The Court recognized the principle of tribal sovereignty,
firmly within the sphere of federal regulation, as a check on state control.83
Worcester first articulated the policy, later “deeply rooted in the Nation’s
history” that “state law could have no role to play within the reservation
boundaries.” 84 Although American Indian jurisprudence has moved away
from the holding in Worcester, the case remains a relevant, but not
conclusive, method to measure the question of a state’s interference into
Indian affairs. 85
Congress reaffirmed the Marshall trilogy’s assertions of federal authority
over Indian affairs fifty years later when it passed the Major Crimes Act of
1885. 86 The statute placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government prosecution for felonies such as murder, assault, arson,
burglary, or robbery committed by an Indian against another Indian on
reservation territory. 87 The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the
statute in United States v. Kagama. 88 There, Justice Samuel Freeman
Miller stated that the Act was necessary for the protection of the weak and
subjugated Indian tribes. 89 More importantly, the federal government had
jurisdiction over such acts “because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
82. See id.; ROSEN, supra note 31, at 45. Georgia initially refused to abide by the
Supreme Court’s decision, but eventually freed the missionaries. ANDERSON ET AL., supra
note 38, at 74–75. The apparent victory in Worcester, however, did not prevent the removal
of Indian tribes from their eastern lands to lands in the west. When President Andrew
Jackson was elected in 1828, he advocated legislation removing Indian tribes from their
coveted eastern lands. Id. at 52; see also ROSEN, supra note 31, at 38–39 (noting Cherokee
territory became particularly valuable to white settlers when gold was discovered there in the
1820s). Under Jackson’s guidance, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411
(1830). The statute authorized the President to provide “so much of any territory belonging
to the United States, west of the river Mississippi” to Indian tribes in exchange for the lands
on which currently resided. Id. at 411–12. As a result, the vast majority of Indian tribes were
forced to move across the Mississippi between 1820 and 1850, including the Cherokee in the
infamous “Trail of Tears.” See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 75; Gould, supra note 66,
at 819.
83. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 481.
84. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (citing Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)).
85. Id. at 172; see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42
(1980) (noting the Court departed from Worcester “[l]ong ago,” but Indian tribes still retain
attributes of sovereignty); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1959) (“Over the years
this Court has modified these principles . . . but the basic policy of Worcester has
remained.”); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall
Trilogy and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative
Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 673–74 (2009) (noting
Worcester is additionally important for the historical understanding of the status of Indian
tribes’ sovereignty in the first decades after the founding and the limitations it placed on
state power).
86. ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)).
87. See id.
88. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
89. Id. at 384.
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enforce its laws on all the tribes.”90 Congress thus had plenary authority
over Indian tribes. 91 The Court affirmed the role of the federal government
as a paternal, civilizing force justified in “protecting” Indian tribes,
reiterating the trust relationship first articulated in Cherokee Nation.92
B. A History of Distrust: The Seneca Treaties
This section discusses the treaties between the United States and the
Seneca Indians. It first describes the initial treaties of the Senecas with the
infant United States. 93 It then describes the attempts of New York State to
push out the Senecas and the other Iroquois tribes in the antebellum years of
the nineteenth century. 94 It then describes the controversy surrounding the
Buffalo Creek treaty and the subsequent compromise treaty to assure the
tribes of the goodwill of the federal government. 95
As modern Indian jurisprudence has moved away from Worcester’s
sovereignty paradigm as a bar to state intervention, “the trend has been . . .
toward reliance on federal pre-emption.” 96 State regulation is preempted
when the federal government has established comprehensive statutes and
regulations, including treaties.97 As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, “modern cases thus tend to
avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead
to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state
power.” 98 In Attea, the Seneca Nation submitted an amicus brief arguing
that New York’s tax scheme violated federal treaties which they claim
prohibit New York from taxing transactions occurring on tribal land.99
Because the New York Court of Appeals did not address these treaty
claims, the Supreme Court stated they were not properly brought before the
Court and accordingly did not decide the merits of the Senecas’ treaty
claims. 100
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on its merits, the Seneca
Nation’s treaty claims form an important part of its opposition to New
York’s tax scheme. Because they have not yet litigated their treaty rights,
90. Id. at 384–85.
91. Id.; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 674 (2006) (stating
Kagama articulated the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes even within the state
where the Indian reservations were located).
92. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Gould, supra note 66, at 827–28;
Skibine, supra note 91, at 675 (noting Kagama reiterated the “guardian-ward paradigm” of
Cherokee Nation to justify the federal government’s authority over Indian tribes).
93. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
94. See infra Part I.B.4.
95. See infra Part I.B.5–6.
96. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
97. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
98. 411 U.S. at 172.
99. Dep’t. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 77 n.11
(1994) (“We do not address this contention, which differs markedly from respondent’s
position and which was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.”).
100. Id.
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the Senecas argue that courts have failed “to address the uniqueness of [the
Senecas’] situation.” 101 Indeed, Felix S. Cohen, a preeminent Indian law
scholar and architect of the Indian New Deal, stated that the treaties of the
tribes of New York give them “a peculiar status.” 102
1. Fort Stanwix Treaty (1784)
Soon after the American Revolution, New York forced the Confederated
Congress to address the balance between federal and state jurisdiction in
Indian affairs. 103 Congress challenged New York’s desire to use Iroquois
land for military bounty lands.104 New York Governor George Clinton
refused to cooperate with the federal government on Indian affairs.105 The
federal government thus tried to resolve the issue by negotiating a treaty
with the Senecas, Mohawks, Onondagas, and Cayugas in 1784, the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix. 106 While the federal and the Indian representatives
negotiated, the federal government posted sentries to keep New York State
Indian Commissioners from interfering with the negotiations.107 The
Treaty drew a line forming the western boundary of Iroquois territory.108
The Iroquois gave up its claims to the western lands of Ohio and, in return,
they were “secured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit east
and north of the same.” 109 The federal government agreed to protect the
lands of the tribes; however, the State was determined to undermine the
efforts of the federal government to prevent white settlement
encroachment. 110 Even after the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, New York
encouraged settlers to migrate to Indian lands and continued to engage in
sales with Indian nations for their lands, often reselling it to white settlers
for a significant profit. 111
2. Fort Harmar Treaty (1789)
Far from appeasing the Iroquois, many tribal leaders viewed the large
land concessions of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as a humiliating

101. Testimony of J.C. Seneca, Co-Chair of the Seneca Nation of Indians Foreign
Relations Comm. Before the S. Comm. on Investigations and Gov’t Operations, 2009–2010
Sess. 8 (N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Testimony of J.C. Seneca].
102. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 416 (1942).
103. See LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION
AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK STATE 63 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103,
at 63.
107. BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 279 (1971)
(describing the federal government’s fear that the uncooperative New York agents would
attempt to bribe tribal representatives with liquor); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 63.
108. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, art. III, 7 Stat. 15.
109. Id.
110. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 63–64.
111. Id. at 64 (noting “[l]and ‘purchased’ by state ‘treaty’ from Oneidas for fifty cents an
acre was sold for seven to ten times its original purchasing price”).
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frustration. 112 Widespread sickness and factionalism among the tribes
prevented the treaty from gaining the legitimacy it needed to effectively
establish peace.113 Five years later, U.S. commissioners met with the
Iroquois tribes again and created the Treaty of Fort Harmar. 114 The treaty
reaffirmed the boundary line created by the Fort Stanwix treaty. 115 The
treaty additionally confirmed that the United States would relinquish its
claims to Iroquois land “lying east and north of the beforementioned
boundary line.” 116 The treaty also proclaimed that the “peace and
friendship” articulated in the Fort Stanwix treaty would be “perpetual.”117
Just as the text of the Treaty of Fort Harmar mirrored its predecessor at Fort
Stanwix, the treaty was similarly met with controversy by the tribes.118
3. Canandaigua Treaty (1794)
The United States and the Iroquois tribes met again in 1794 to create a
treaty which would finally end the unrest of the western Indian wars.119
The product of these meetings remains the most important treaty regarding
Iroquois sovereignty. 120 Called the Canandaigua Treaty, or sometimes the
Pickering Treaty (after U.S. Commissioner Thomas Pickering), the parties
signed the treaty on November 11, 1794. 121 The treaty recognized the lands
of the Iroquois and promised “the United States will never claim the same,
nor disturb them or either of the Six [Iroquois] Nations . . . in the free use
and enjoyment thereof: but the said reservations shall remain theirs, until
they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have
the right to purchase.” 122
The Senecas claim this language established a jurisdictional boundary
assuring “no other government has the right to interfere in how [the
Senecas] use those lands without [the Senecas’] consent” and that “New
York State has no authority over . . . commerce taking place on [Seneca]
lands.” 123 The treaty also redrew the lines of the Senecas’ western borders,
returning to them lands relinquished in the 1784 and 1789 treaties in
112. GRAYMONT, supra note 107, at 16–17 (noting “the Indians were extremely frustrated
in their attempts to secure a written copy of the American commissioners’ speeches and the
treaty”); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 168 (noting the “humiliation” of the Indian nations
at Fort Stanwix).
113. GRAYMONT, supra note 107, at 278.
114. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33.
115. Id. art. 1 (stating that the nations agreed “to renew and confirm all the engagements
and stipulations entered into at the beforementioned treaty at fort Stanwix”).
116. Id. art. 2.
117. Id. art. 4.
118. Barbara Alice Mann, The Greenville Treaty of 1795: Pen-and-Ink Witchcraft in the
Struggle for the Old Northwest, in ENDURING LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 135, 162 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 2004) (describing
how native sources and traditions question the legitimacy of the Fort Harmar tribal leaders’
mandate to make such an agreement).
119. COHEN, supra note 102, at 419.
120. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90.
121. Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
122. Id. art. 2.
123. Testimony of J.C. Seneca, supra note 101, at 6–7.
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exchange for the tribes’ recognition of the U.S. claims in the Ohio territory,
west of American borders. 124
In its immediate aftermath, the Treaty of Canandaigua cemented the
termination of violent conflict between the United States and the Indian
tribes on its western frontier. 125 The Seneca viewed the treaty as the federal
government’s affirmation of Seneca tribal sovereignty and as a pact among
equals. 126 From a long-term perspective, this treaty, in conjunction with the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the Treaty of Fort Harmar, “had the effect of
placing the tribes and their reservation beyond the operation and effect of
general state laws.” 127
4. The Senecas’ Fight Against Removal
Despite this trilogy of treaties, the Senecas were not long at peace. Like
many of his contemporaries, New York Governor De Witt Clinton believed
Indian tribes were destined for extinction.128 Thus, the solution to New
York’s Indian problems became removal to the west.129 Clinton and others
saw the native lands of central and western New York as lands of bountiful
opportunity not only for agriculture and natural resources, but more
importantly for trade and transportation. 130 Indeed, the “transportation
revolution” wrought by the completion of the Erie Canal would bring
fortune to the non-Indian settlers of Western New York but lead “to the
undoing of the Iroquois.” 131
New York also began to assert criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians against other Indians. In 1822, a Seneca council
condemned a Seneca woman to death for witchcraft.132 Tommy Jemmy
executed the woman, and he was arrested by the New York authorities and
convicted of murder. 133 Jemmy challenged the conviction, arguing that he
was carrying out the legally valid judgment of the tribal court.134 The New
York Court for the Correction of Errors rejected this argument and held
state law supreme over Jemmy’s actions.135 The New York state legislature
124. Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, arts. III–IV, 7 Stat. 44; COHEN, supra
note 102, at 419; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90 (describing the federal receding of land
to the Seneca and the Seneca recognition of federal land claims in the west as “remarkable”).
125. Jack Campisi & William A. Starna, On the Road to Canandaigua: The Treaty of
1794, 19 AM. INDIAN Q. 467, 467 (1995) (stating the treaty “ended a turbulent period of
enmity that had threatened to engulf the fledgling United States in what would have been a
destructive Indian war”); see also HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90 (noting the treaty
“resolved longstanding issues that had never been resolved between the Iroquois, most
notably the Seneca, and the federal government at the end of the American Revolution”).
126. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 90.
127. COHEN, supra note 102, at 419.
128. Vivian C. Hopkins, De Witt Clinton and the Iroquois, 8 ETHNOHISTORY 213, 214
(1961).
129. Id.; see supra note 82.
130. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 17.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689, 694–95 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
133. Id. at 695.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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responded by passing an act which declared “the . . . exclusive jurisdiction
of trying and punishing all and every person, of whatsoever nation or tribe,
for crimes and offenses committed within any part of the state . . . was
exclusively vested in the courts of justice of this state.” 136 After asserting
their jurisdiction over such crimes, the legislature pardoned Tommy
Jemmy. 137
New York courts also asserted New York State’s place in Indian affairs
in Murray v. Wooden, 138 deciding the validity of an Oneida Indian’s land
deed from 1809. The Supreme Court of Judicature ruled that the U.S.
Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause did not extend to an individual’s
disposition of Indian lands. 139 Since the Constitution did not cover such
transactions, the court concluded that the Tenth Amendment reserved the
power to the states. 140 Because New York law at the time of the
conveyance of the deed permitted the transaction, the court upheld the
validity of the deed despite federal prohibition of Indian land
conveyances. 141 Thus, in the decades following the Treaty of Canandaigua,
New York began to assert its authority over the Indian tribes more
aggressively despite the presence of federal treaties ostensibly protecting
tribes from such intrusion.
The construction of the Erie Canal made Buffalo one of the largest cities
in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. 142 The city
bordered the Seneca Buffalo Creek Reservation, and the city’s expansion
depended on the extinguishment of this Indian territory to open land to
Buffalo’s increasing white population.143 Land speculators bought the land
bordering the reservation and even lobbied the President of the United
States for Seneca removal. 144
In 1823, President James Monroe’s Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
allowed the Ogden Land Company, a powerful group of politically
connected land speculators, to conduct a preliminary survey of the Buffalo
Creek lands. 145 The Senecas, however, withstood the company’s and New
York’s pressure to sell their lands. 146 The federal government appointed
136. Act of Apr. 12, 1822, ch. 204, 1822 N.Y. Laws 202; see Hatch, 118 N.Y.S. at 695.
137. Hatch, 118 N.Y.S. at 695.
138. 17 Wend. 531, 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
139. Id. at 537–38 (stating “there is some difficulty in perceiving how the clause can be
construed as applying to the disposition of Indian lands . . . . It would seem to be carrying the
power simply ‘to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,’ to an extent beyond the
legitimate and common meaning of the terms themselves”); see Deborah A. Rosen,
Colonization Through Law: The Judicial Defense of State Indian Legislation, 1790–1880,
46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 26, 39 (2004).
140. See Murray, 17 Wend. at 538.
141. See id. at 539–40.
142. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 101.
143. Id. at 101–02; see also id. at 161 (describing the antebellum population boom of
white settlers in western New York); Hopkins, supra note 128, at 216 (stating that Governor
Clinton believed the “only solution for the problem of New York Indians” was removal of
the tribes to the west).
144. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 114–15.
145. Id. at 119.
146. Id. at 148.
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Oliver Forward, a local judge, to deal with the Senecas. 147 On August 31,
1826, the Senecas, through several interpreters, came to an agreement with
the Ogden Land Company in a controversial treaty brokered under the
authority of the United States through Forward. 148 The treaty reduced
Seneca land by approximately 87,000 acres. 149 The tribe ceded several
reservations and reduced the Buffalo Creek, Tonawanda, and Cattaraugus
reservations as well. 150
The Senecas questioned the legality of the treaty almost immediately.
The U.S. Senate never ratified the treaty and most Senecas opposed it.151
Forward allegedly received money from the managers of the Ogden Land
Company, and some of the Seneca chiefs were apparently bribed.152
Forward received such extensive criticism that he wrote to President John
Quincy Adams to justify his actions, stating that all the Seneca chiefs were
fully knowledgeable of all the proposals and voluntarily agreed to sell the
lands. 153
Seneca leader Red Jacket and his followers appealed directly to President
Adams, emphasizing the significant Seneca opposition to the treaty.154
They stated that Forward only gave the Senecas two days to decide to sell
the land, and they were threatened with being driven off their land by the
federal government. 155 Red Jacket and two other Seneca Indians met with
President Adams on March 24, 1828. 156 They urged the President to
investigate their fraud allegations and asked that the Seneca not be removed
to Wisconsin. 157 After debate, the Senate failed to ratify the treaty.158 The
Senate then issued a resolution stating that its failure to ratify the treaty did
not necessarily signify its disapproval of the contract’s terms. 159
The President, however, swayed by the anti-treaty arguments, appointed
Richard Livingston to investigate the circumstances of the 1826 treaty.160
Livingston’s report revealed that fraud surrounded the signing of the
147. N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., REP. OF SPEC. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE INDIAN PROBLEM OF
THE STATE OF N.Y., 1888-51, 1888 Sess., at 23 (1888) [hereinafter WHIPPLE REPORT];
HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 153.
148. See Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283, 285 (1896) (“By a treaty and
conveyance on that day the Seneca Nation, by its sachems, chiefs and warriors, in the
presence of a . . . commissioner appointed by the United States, conveyed a tract of eightyseven thousand acres of [its] lands . . . for the consideration of $48,216, acknowledged by
the deed to have been in hand and paid.”); HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154.
149. Christy, 162 U.S. at 285; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55.
150. WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 147 at 23; HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55.
151. Christy, 162 U.S. at 285–86; WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 147, at 23; HAUPTMAN,
supra note 103, at 154–55.
152. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 154–55.
153. Id. at 155–56.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 157.
156. Id. at 158. See generally Granville Ganter, Red Jacket and the Decolonization of
Republican Virtue, 31 AM. INDIAN Q. 559, 564 (2007).
157. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 158.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 159.
160. Id; see Ganter, supra note 156, at 571.
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controversial treaty. 161 Livingston said Seneca chiefs were not willing to
sell their land until ten days after the treaty council.162 Livingston found
that the Ogden Land Company paid the interpreters “to ‘influence’ the
Seneca to extinguish their title.” 163 Livingston also stated that the chiefs
were under duress due to threats of forcible removal. 164 He suggested that
Forward and the Ogden Land Company met surreptitiously before the treaty
council and that many chiefs were financially dependent on federal
annuities. 165 Livingston’s largely negative report prevented the 1826 treaty
from resubmission to the Senate. 166
5. Buffalo Creek Treaty Controversy
On January 15, 1838 the federal government concluded another treaty
with the New York Indians providing lands for the tribes in Kansas.167 The
treaty also apportioned funds for the removal and resettlement of the
tribes. 168 The Senecas, still disputing the Ogden Land Company’s deed,
refused to leave their reservations or move to Kansas. 169 The federal
government had no desire to forcibly remove the Senecas.170
6. Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty (1842)
In response to the overwhelming accusations of fraud and deceit and the
Senecas’ refusal to move west, the U.S. government negotiated a new
“compromise treaty” with the Senecas at Buffalo Creek, which the U.S.
Senate ratified in 1842. 171 The new treaty returned the Allegany and
Cattaraugus reservations to the Senecas, but not the Buffalo Creek and
Tonawanda reservations. 172 The treaty also stated that the United States
would “protect . . . the lands of the Seneca Indians, within the State of New
York . . . from all taxes, and assessments for roads, highways, or any other
purpose.” 173 As a result of the political fracturing emanating from the

161. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 159.
162. Id. at 159–60.
163. Id; see Ganter, supra note 156, at 570.
164. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 159–60. There were also allegations that the chiefs
had been bribed with liquor. COHEN, supra note 102, at 420.
165. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 160.
166. Id.
167. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550; see COHEN, supra note 102,
at 420.
168. Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550; see COHEN, supra note 102,
at 420.
169. COHEN, supra note 102, at 420.
170. Id. (noting the government did not want to repeat the Trail of Tears).
171. Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, 7 Stat. 586; see HAUPTMAN, supra note 103,
at 191.
172. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 177.
173. Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, art. IX, 7 Stat. 586.

2318

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

controversy, the Senecas created an independent constitutional government,
the Seneca Nation of Indians, in 1848. 174
By the last years of the nineteenth century, the U.S. government removed
many eastern Indian tribes to western territories.175 The Seneca Nation,
however, was an exception, which created problems for New York State.176
In In re The New York Indians, 177 the Supreme Court held that the New
York State legislation taxing Seneca reservations violated federal treaties,
reversing a decision of the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court examined New York legislation passed in 1841 during the Buffalo
Creek controversy when removal of the Senecas seemed imminent.178
However, the legislation contained the provision that “the failure to
extinguish the right of the Indians . . . shall not impair the validity of said
taxes, or prevent the collection thereof.”179 The Court regarded this
provision as “a very free, if not extraordinary, exercise of power over these
reservations and the rights of Indians, so long possessed and so frequently
guaranteed by treaties.” 180
The Court began its analysis by looking to federal treaties, stating that
“the rights of Indians do not depend on this or any other statutes of the
State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land.”181
Reiterating the text of the Treaty of Canandaigua, the Court affirmed the
federal government’s acknowledgment that the reservations are the property
of the Senecas. 182 Such an acknowledgment signified that the Indians
“were entitled to the undisturbed enjoyment” of their “ancient possessions
and occupancy” unless removed by the federal government. 183
The Court denied the State’s power to tax these lands. 184 “Until the
Indians have sold their lands, and removed from them in pursuance of the
treaty stipulations,” they retain their original rights articulated in the federal
treaties. 185 Taxing these lands before removal was thus “premature and
illegal.” 186 The Court described the reservations as “wholly exempt from
State taxation,” and thus New York’s tax was “an unwarrantable
interference, inconsistent with the original title of the Indians, and offensive

174. HAUPTMAN, supra note 103, at 12; Testimony of J.C. Seneca, supra note 101, at 5;
Porter, supra note 36, at 137–38 (emphasizing the role of New York state pressure in the
“Seneca Revolution” resulting in a constitutional republic).
175. ROSEN, supra note 31, at 76.
176. See id. at 79.
177. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 771–72 (1866).
178. Id. at 768 (“This explanation . . . removes the inference that might otherwise be
drawn, that the legislature were encouraging . . . a direct interference by the owners of the
right of pre-emption with these ancient possessions and occupations, secured by the most
sacred of obligations of the Federal government.”); COHEN, supra note 102, at 420.
179. In re The New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 764 (emphasis omitted).
180. Id. at 766.
181. Id. at 768.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 770.
184. Id. at 769 (citing In re The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866)).
185. Id. at 770.
186. Id.
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to their tribal relations.” 187 Because the Senecas’ treaty rights remained
intact, the federal government had exclusive control.188
C. Modern Federal Indian Policy: A Government-to-Government
Approach
This section outlines the shift in federal Indian policy toward establishing
government-to-government relationships with Indian tribes. It begins by
outlining the origins of this policy with the politics of the New Deal.189
This section then proceeds to discuss how this policy became cemented in
the 1960s and 1970s through the promotion of Indian self-determination. 190
The advocacy of government-to-government dealings not only forms the
starting point of federal Indian regulation, but it is also a potential model for
resolving the conflict between New York and the Indian tribes. 191
1. The Indian New Deal
The election of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led to a profound
shift in federal Indian policy. 192 The focus moved from Indian assimilation
into white American culture to an emphasis on the development of tribal
economies and governments. 193 Indians had not abandoned their tribal
culture as the assimilationists hoped. 194 Also, Congress disapproved of the
tremendous amount of federal funds being diverted to expansive
governmental regulation of Indian tribes.195 Led by Commissioner of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs John Collier and legal scholar Felix S. Cohen, this
“new deal” aimed at preventing the loss of Indian land and providing
statutory support for Indian self-government. 196
Congress encapsulated the Roosevelt administration’s Indian policy in
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 197 The Act ended the
allotment of Indian reservation land to individual Indians 198 and authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to return to tribal governance surplus land that

187. Id. at 771.
188. See id.; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 169 (1973)
(noting that the Court “unambiguously rejected state efforts to impose a land tax on
reservation Indians”).
189. See infra Part I.C.1.
190. See infra Part I.C.2.
191. See infra Part III.
192. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 130; see Gould, supra note 66, at 832.
193. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 128.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in
Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 18 (2009); G. William Rice, The Indian
Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed
Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 578
(2009).
197. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79
(2006)).
198. 25 U.S.C § 461.
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had not yet been open to non-Indians. 199 The Act also mandated that
Indians receive a preference for job openings in the Indian office.200 Indian
chartered corporations could receive loans from the federal government “for
the purpose of promoting the economic development of such tribes and of
their members.” 201 Indian tribes would be authorized to adopt a tribal
constitution and bylaws for self-governance. 202 Furthermore, the Act
would not apply to reservations where a majority of Indian adults voted
against its application.203 Thus, with the IRA, Congress attempted to return
to the tribes some self-regulatory agency and promote a “government-togovernment” approach to the relationship between the United States and the
tribes. 204
The Indian New Deal policies also produced the Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946 (ICCA). 205 The Act created a Commission which
acted as a tribunal to adjudicate claims against the United States on behalf
of Indian tribes. 206 Permissible claims against the United States under the
statute were constitutional claims, tort claims otherwise permissible against
the United States, treaty or contract claims “on the ground of fraud, duress,
unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake,” land takings
claims, and claims “based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.” 207 The architects of the
Act intended to create a venue to correct past injustices. 208
2. Indian Self-Determination
The Indian New Deal ideas about tribal self-government, unpopular
during World War II and the 1950s, 209 re-emerged with the election of
President John F. Kennedy, who promised to protect tribal land rights and
to encourage Indian political participation.210 President Lyndon B.
199. Id. § 463(a); see Gould, supra note 66, at 832.
200. 25 U.S.C § 472.
201. Id. § 470.
202. Id. § 476(a).
203. Id. § 478. The Iroquois Six Nations were some of the most prominent tribes to reject
the Act. See generally LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, THE IROQUOIS & THE NEW DEAL (1981).
204. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 155 (1980) (stating the IRA evidences “a congressional concern with fostering tribal
self-government and economic development”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
145, 152 (1973) (“The intent and purpose of the Reorganization Act was ‘to rehabilitate the
Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a
century of oppression and paternalism.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1804, at 6 (1934)));
Skibine, supra note 91, at 675.
205. Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1946))
(omitted from the U.S. Code when the Indian Claims Commission terminated in 1978).
206. Id. § 2, 60 Stat. at 1050.
207. Id.
208. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 132.
209. Congress cut funding for Indian programs during World War II. Id. at 140. During
the 1950s, a movement emerged aimed at terminating the special status of Indian tribes to
remove what its proponents believed were barriers to Indian assimilation into white society.
Id. at 141. Many Indians migrated to urban areas like Chicago or Los Angeles. Id. at 148.
210. Id. at 149.
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Johnson’s “War on Poverty” programs further encouraged the development
Indians benefited from programs
of Indian self-determination. 211
emphasizing local control, and tribes began to provide their own social
services and schools for their members. 212 The federal Office of Economic
Opportunity also supported on-reservation legal aid and studies which
revealed substantial disparities between Indians and non-Indians in health,
education, and social welfare.213
President Richard Nixon’s administration “formal[ly] inaugurat[ed]”
Indian self-determination. 214 On July 8, 1970, President Nixon delivered a
Special Message on Indian Affairs to Congress. 215 The President rejected
the federal government’s role as a trustee toward Indian tribes that could
break its tie with the tribes unilaterally. 216 Instead, the President stated that
“[t]he special relationship between Indians and the Federal government is
the result . . . of solemn obligations which have been entered into by the
United States . . . through written treaties and through formal and informal
agreements . . . .” 217 The President went on to indicate his view that the
new goal of federal Indian policy must be “to strengthen the Indian’s sense
of autonomy without threatening his sense of community. We must assure
the Indian that he can assume control of his own life without being
separated involuntarily from the tribal group. . . . [and] without being cut
off from Federal concern and Federal support.” 218 Nixon also emphasized
that Indians should be the leaders developing this policy. 219 Subsequent
presidents have reaffirmed the federal government’s responsibility to
operate in a “sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty. . . . within a
government-to-government relationship with federally recognized Native
American tribes.” 220
In accordance with the ideas put forward by the Nixon administration,
Congress, in 1975, passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDEA). 221 The Act underlined a “firm federal policy of
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” 222 This
211. Kunesh, supra note 196, at 28–29.
212. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 149.
213. Id.
214. Kunesh, supra note 196, at 26–27.
215. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8,
1970).
216. Id. at 567.
217. Id. at 565.
218. Id. at 566–67.
219. Id.
220. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994); see also Memorandum on Tribal
Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 9, 2009) (“History has shown that failure to include
the voices of tribal officials in formulating policy affecting their communities has all too
often led to undesirable and, at times, devastating and tragic results. . . . Consultation is a
critical ingredient of a sound and productive Federal-tribal relationship.”).
221. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450
(2006)).
222. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see also
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (noting the Indian
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legislation allows tribes to enter into contracts with the federal government
so they may take control over the administration of federal programs for the
health, education, and welfare of Indians.223 Several other statutes
enhanced tribal control over on-reservation housing development 224 and
provided funding for tribal education projects, especially, for example,
tribally-controlled colleges or universities.225
Today, government-to-government respect is a cornerstone goal of selfdetermination. The federal government has attempted to give equal weight
to concerns about independence and support for Indian tribes. This selfdetermination policy defines the relationship between the federal
government and Indians, but questions about where exactly the balance tilts
during the changing political climate remain.
II. A MODERN-DAY JURISDICTIONAL BATTLEGROUND: STATE TAXATION
OF CIGARETTE SALES TO NON-INDIANS ON RESERVATION LAND
This part introduces the modern controversy which has entangled the
states, the tribes, and the federal government for several decades. First, this
part discusses the line of Supreme Court cases leading to their decision in
Attea which established a set of general boundaries without crafting a
definitive solution. 226 This part proceeds to discuss New York State’s
enactment of a scheme taxing transactions with non-Indians on
reservations 227 and the Attea decisions in New York State courts. 228 This
part then examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Attea. 229 Next, this
part focuses on the conflict and confusion in the decade following Attea and
the renewal of the conflict when the New York State legislature enacted a
new tax scheme in 2010. 230 Finally, this part offers a parallel story by
examining Washington State’s successful solution to its analogous
problem. 231
State taxation of transactions with non-Indians on reservation land is an
arena where the competing interests of the state, the tribes, and the federal
government battle.
States have an obvious regulatory interest in
taxation. 232 Indian tribes have a clear interest in developing their
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEA) as an example of “the
congressional goal of Indian self-government” which has an “‘overriding goal’ of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development” (quoting New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334–35 (1983)).
223. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 153; Rebecca Anita
Tsosie, What Does It Mean To “Build a Nation”? Re-imagining Indigenous Political
Identity in an Era of Self-Determination, ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J., Winter 2006, at 38, 41
(2006).
224. Native American Housing Assistance Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 4101.
225. Tribally Controlled Colleges or University Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1801.
226. See infra Part II.A.1.
227. See infra Part II.A.2.
228. See infra Part II.A.3.
229. See infra Part II.B.
230. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
231. See infra Part II.C.
232. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
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economies and in the revenue they gain from doing business with nonIndians who come to tribal territory. Lastly, the federal government has an
interest in promoting tribal self-determination and preventing states from
interfering with its power to regulate tribal affairs. 233 These interests thus
forced the Supreme Court to engage in a complex balancing act.
A. A Prelude to Attea
First, this section describes the line of Supreme Court cases which set the
stage for the Court’s decision in Attea. 234 This section then discusses the
New York legislation enacted in the aftermath of these cases, attempting to
tax cigarette sales to non-Indians on reservation land. 235 Finally, this
section examines the Attea decisions in the New York State courts. 236
1. Delineating Without Deciding: From Warren to Potawatomi
Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing for the next three decades,
the Supreme Court attempted to formally delineate the boundaries of the
states’ taxation authority over Indian activities. Perhaps motivated by the
goals of the Indian New Deal and the corresponding promotion of Indian
self-determination and tribal sovereignty, the Court attempted to create a
framework through which a state’s involvement in tribal enterprise could be
measured.
In 1965, Justice Hugo Black delivered the Court’s unanimous decision in
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission. 237 There, the
appellant, Warren Trading Post Company, was licensed by the U.S.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs as a retail trader on the Arizona-located
portion of the Navajo Indian Reservation. 238 Arizona levied a two percent
tax on Warren’s gross income. 239 Warren claimed that this tax, as applied
to the income derived from its Indian reservation business, was
unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and “inconsistent with the comprehensive congressional plan
. . . to regulate Indian trade and traders and to have Indian tribes on
reservations govern themselves.” 240 The Arizona Supreme Court upheld
the tax; the Supreme Court reversed, finding the tax preempted by federal
regulation. 241 Because the Court decided the case on this issue, it did not
reach the issue of whether the Indian Commerce Clause barred the tax. 242
The Court began its discussion by reiterating Chief Justice Marshall’s
words from Worcester: Indian treaties with the United States contemplated
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id. at 142–43; see also supra Part I.C.1–2.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
380 U.S. 685 (1965).
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 686.
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tribal territory as separate from that of the states, giving the federal
government exclusive dealings with the tribes.243 Justice Black continued
to outline the history of federal regulations of Indians, including the Trade
The Court stated that “[s]uch
and Intercourse Act of 1790. 244
comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders has continued from that
day to this.” 245 Under these “apparently all-inclusive regulations,” the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs licensed Warren Trading Post to do
business with the Navajo tribe.246 The Court concluded that such extensive
regulations and legislation “would seem in themselves sufficient to show
that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so
full in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional
burdens upon traders.” 247
The Court also considered the particular history of the Navajo
Reservation, noting that since its founding in the nineteenth century, the
tribe had run its affairs without state interference, “which has automatically
relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same
responsibilities.” 248 Thus, the tax would substantially frustrate the
exclusively federal oversight of Indian trade. 249 Additionally, the tax
would burden traders like Warren and its Indian consumers, disturbing
federal control and protection against fraud or unfairness. 250 Because
“federal legislation has left the State with no duties or responsibilities
respecting the reservation Indians,” the Court ruled that the state could not
levy such a tax against a federally licensed Indian trader’s sales to
reservation Indians. 251
Five years after Warren, the Supreme Court “once again [had] to
reconcile the plenary power of the States over residents within their borders
with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations.”252
In McClanahan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
engaged in a similar analysis to that of Justice Black’s in Warren, this time
analyzing the legitimacy of Arizona’s personal income tax on Rosalind
McClanahan, a Navajo reservation Indian whose income came solely from
her work on the Navajo Reservation.253 The Court held that the tax was an
impermissible state interference into fields established by federal statutes,
regulations, and Indian treaties as “the exclusive province of the Federal
Government and the Indians themselves.” 254

243. Id. at 688 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556–57 (1832)).
244. Id. (citing Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 690.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 690–91.
250. Id. at 691.
251. Id. at 691–92.
252. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Justice Marshall began his analysis with “a brief statement of what this
case [did] not involve.” 255 The Court limited its decision to those Indians
living on reservations who “possess the usual accoutrements of tribal selfgovernment.” 256 Thus, the Court placed its analysis within the framework
of principles of tribal sovereignty rather than making a statement about the
individual rights of Indians by virtue of their native ancestry. Neither did
the holding reach the activity of reservation Indians on non-reservation
lands. 257 More importantly, however, the Court carved out the issue of
state sovereignty over non-Indians involved in activity on Indian
reservations as an additional exception to its holding, an issue which would
form the basis of later decisions central to this controversy. 258
Justice Marshall then proceeded, like Justice Black did in Warren, to
examine the history of federal and state interaction with Indian affairs.259
The Court then stated that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the
corresponding issue of the state’s permitted interference have evolved
considerably since Worcester: “[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been
adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the
affairs of non-Indians.” 260 Thus, when determining the legitimacy of such
state regulation, “the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption.” 261 Relevant treaties and statutes delineate the boundaries of the
State’s regulatory power. 262 Indian sovereignty is still important “because
it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read.” 263
The Court held that the treaties between the U.S. government and the
Navajo nation preempted the application of Arizona’s personal income tax
to McClanahan. 264 The McClanahan Court followed the Warren Court’s
interpretation of the federal Navajo treaty, reading it “to preclude extension
of state law—including state tax law—to Indians on the Navajo
Reservation.” 265 Arizona could not claim it possessed a legitimate interest
to apply its tax to the income of reservation Indians.266
On the same day it decided McClanahan, the Court also decided a
companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.267 There the Court,
with Justice Byron White writing for the majority, 268 decided whether a
255. Id. at 167.
256. Id. at 167–68.
257. Id. at 168.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. Id at 172.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 173.
265. Id. at 175.
266. See id. at 179.
267. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
268. Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and Potter
Stewart. Id. at 159 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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New Mexico tax on the gross receipts of a ski resort owned by the
Mescalero Apache tribe and located on non-reservation land and a use tax
on certain ski lifts bought out of state for the resort were permissible.269
The Court explicitly rejected the tribe’s articulation of the exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Indian affairs taken from Worcester. 270 It stated that
“[g]eneralizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous.”271
The Court reiterated McClanahan’s holding that “in the special area of state
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation.” 272 However, the taxed activity in Mescalero occurred off the
Mescalero Apache reservation.273 Contrary to the analysis of state taxation
of on-reservation activity, “[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary,
Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the State.” 274 The Court held that the IRA did not prohibit state income
taxation of off-reservation tribal enterprises.275
However, the Court found the tax on the ski lifts impermissible.276 The
Court deemed the lifts part of the tribe’s property and the “use of permanent
improvements upon land is so intimately connected with use of the land
itself that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must
be construed to encompass an exemption for the former.” 277 Because the
IRA prohibited such a property tax, New Mexico could not extend its
taxation authority in this manner. 278
Although the Court in Warren and McClanahan seemingly endorsed a
broad limitation on the state taxation of Indian traders and persons, it
qualified these assertions when it decided Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation. 279 There, the Court ruled that
Montana could impose sales taxes on tobacco products sold on Indian
reservations to non-Indian purchasers who would otherwise bear the
ultimate tax burden.280
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice William Rehnquist began by
outlining the history of the Flathead reservation of the confederated Salish
and Kootenai tribes in Montana. 281 Joseph Wheeler, a tribal member,
leased tracts of reservation land on which he operated a retail tobacco

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 466–69.
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store. 282 Wheeler and one of his Indian employees were arrested by
Montana deputy sheriffs for two misdemeanors: selling non-tax-stamped
cigarettes and failing to possess cigarette retailer licenses.283 Wheeler, his
employee, the tribe, and the tribal chairmen, sued in federal court for
“declaratory and injunctive relief against the State’s cigarette tax and
vendor-licensing statutes as applied to tribal members who sold cigarettes
within the reservation.” 284 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana ruled that Montana could not levy its cigarettes taxes on tribal
cigarette retailers but it may “require a precollection of the tax imposed by
law upon the non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes.” 285 The State directly
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the district court’s
judgment. 286
The tribe argued that Montana could not impose its cigarette tax on sales
from Indians to non-Indians. 287 The Court rejected this argument, holding:
Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor as to the retail purchaser
[under the Montana statute], the competitive advantage which the Indian
seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers,
within and without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the
tax. 288

The Court distinguished Warren, stating that the tax there, a gross income
tax imposed directly on the seller, was different from the tax at issue, which
placed the tax on the non-Indian purchaser rather than the Indian retailer.289
Montana may require “the Indian tribal seller [to] collect a tax validly
imposed on non-Indians” because it is “a minimal burden designed to avoid
the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal
seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.” 290 The Court found
“nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government, or runs
afoul of any congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation
Indians.” 291
Although Justice Rehnquist analyzed the relevant federal treaties and
statutes (following Justice Marshall’s analysis in McClanahan), the
discussion of tribal sovereignty in McClanahan and Mescalero as a relevant
background principle guiding the Court’s jurisprudence does not appear in
Moe. In this respect, the Court established an important boundary: where
the taxation of non-Indian purchases on reservation lands are concerned, the
282. Id. at 467.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 467–68.
285. Id. at 468.
286. Id. at 483. The Court also determined federal jurisdiction was proper here because
“the United States could have made the same attack on the State’s assertion of taxing power
as was in fact made by the Tribe.” Id. at 473–74.
287. Id. at 481.
288. Id. at 482.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 483.
291. Id. (citations omitted).
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Court’s jurisprudence is different. States have a legitimate interest in the
taxation of non-Indians, and perhaps that interest makes the background of
tribal sovereignty less important in the balance. Moe thus set a vague
precedent for both state taxation authorities and the tribes. Neither had
guidance as to what each owed each other. Indian retailers had to collect
state taxes against non-Indian purchasers, but just how much the state could
burden the tribe with enforcing its laws was unclear.
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation 292 attempted to clarify this issue. There, the Court
considered “whether an Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax onreservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its own tax
on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues from the tribal
business.” 293 Several Indian tribes in Washington State challenged the
application of Washington’s tax on tobacco products on reservation tobacco
The tribes sought a preliminary injunction against the
outlets. 294
challenged tax’s enforcement, especially against the seizure of untaxed
cigarettes bound for delivery to the reservations.295
The Washington tax required dealers to sell only tax-stamped
cigarettes. 296 The tax provided that “Indian tribes are permitted to possess
unstamped cigarettes for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are
required by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to
nonmembers.” 297 As in Moe, the reservation retailers derived a majority of
their business from non-Indian purchasers coming to the reservation to take
advantage of the tribes’ tax-exempt status. 298 Thus, it is not surprising that
the Court began its analysis of the issue presented by reiterating its holding
in Moe. 299 Justice White distilled Moe to three succinct principles: (1)
states “may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian
customers of Indian retailers doing business on the reservation,” (2) this
type of tax “may be valid even if it seriously disadvantages or eliminates
the Indian retailer’s business with non-Indians,” and (3) states “may impose
at least ‘minimal’ burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and
collecting the tax.” 300
The Court, however, also noted that Moe did not definitively resolve the
issue. 301 In Colville, the tribes levied their own taxes upon the cigarettes
sold on their reservations and also acted as retailers or wholesalers.302
Also, Washington required the tribes to keep detailed records of cigarette

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

447 U.S. 134 (1980).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id.
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sales and precollect the state tax. 303 Moe additionally did not discuss any
problems of enforcement coming from “distinctions between exempt and
nonexempt purchasers.” 304
The Court first affirmed the tribes’ right to impose their own cigarette
taxes as “a fundamental attribute of [tribal] sovereignty.” 305 This
sovereignty “is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States.” 306 Justice White then turned to the tribes’
economic argument: if the tribes were to collect the state tax on top of their
tribal taxes, their businesses would be at a “competitive disadvantage.” 307
The Court rejected the tribes’ assertion that federal Indian law preempted
Washington’s taxes. 308 It explained that “[t]he principle of tribal selfgovernment, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in
congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of
the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the
State, on the other.” 309 The Court analyzed these interests through a
balancing test. 310 The tribes’ interests are greatest when raising revenues
“derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the
Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.” 311 The
state’s interest in raising revenue is strongest when “the tax is directed at
off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state
services.” 312 Because the tax applied to non-Indian purchasers who did not
receive tribal services, Washington’s interest was particularly strong. 313
The Washington tax’s collection burden was “legally indistinguishable”
from Montana’s tax in Moe. 314 The Court thus held that the State may
require tribal cigarette shops to “affix tax stamps purchased from the State
to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers
The Court also held the State’s recordkeeping
of the Tribe.” 315
requirements valid for both taxed and untaxed sales as the tribes did not
meet their burden to demonstrate that “recordkeeping requirements for
exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing
fraudulent transactions.” 316
The Court further held that Washington could permissibly tax Indian
purchasers who were not members of the reservation tribe. 317 Because
these Indians were not the tribes’ constituents and did not receive tribal
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 156–57.
Id.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
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services, “those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians.”318
Thus, the State’s interest in regulating the transactions of these individuals
“outweighs any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the State from
imposing its taxes.” 319 Washington’s interest was also great enough to
justify the seizures of unstamped cigarettes destined for tribal sales.320
However, the Court noted,“[i]t is significant that these seizures take place
outside the reservation, in locations where state power over Indian affairs is
considerably more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.”321
Although Washington argued that it could seize cigarettes on reservation
land, the Court declined to express an opinion on this obviously politically
controversial question as it was not properly before it.322
Thus, the Colville Court attempted to clarify the principles set forth in
Moe, but without going further than the facts necessitated. Rather than
articulate broad boundaries for the state and the tribes, the Court’s decision
seemed to imply that it would treat state taxation of cigarettes sold to nonIndians on Indian reservations on a case-by-case basis. Thus, Colville
strengthened the Court’s past precedent without providing a workable
framework for the future, most importantly in the area of enforcement.
Seventeen days after deciding Colville, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 323 in which Justice
Marshall wrote the opinion of a divided Court.324 There, Arizona sought to
impose fuel taxes on the petitioner, Pinetop Logging Company (Pinetop).325
Pinetop was a non-Indian enterprise only operating on the Fort Apache
Indian Reservation in Arizona. 326 The Tribe and Pinetop argued that
federal law preempted such taxes; the Supreme Court agreed, reversing the
decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals. 327
The Court recognized that logging timber on Indian reservation land was
an activity extensively regulated by the federal government. 328 Such timber
“is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and cannot be
harvested for sale without the consent of Congress.” 329 Thus, Pinetop’s
activities were subject to federal control.330
Justice Marshall began his analysis by stating that the Court’s prior
decisions “establish several basic principles with respect to the boundaries
between state regulatory authority and tribal self-government.”331
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 162.
322. Id.
323. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
324. See id. at 137. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Stewart and Justice
Rehnquist.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 137–38.
327. Id.
328. See id. at 138–39.
329. Id. at 138.
330. Id. at 139.
331. Id. at 141.
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However, “there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a
particular state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal
members.” 332 Congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause
and the unique position of the Indian tribes “have given rise to two
independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority
over tribal reservations and members.” 333
First, the Court reiterated that the exercise of state regulatory authority
“may be pre-empted by federal law,” citing Warren and McClanahan as
examples. 334 Second, such state regulation “may unlawfully infringe ‘on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.’” 335 These barriers are independent because they may each provide a
“sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on
the reservation.” 336 Ultimately tribal sovereignty is subject to the review of
Congress; however, the Court reiterated, “traditional notions of Indian selfgovernment . . . have provided an important ‘backdrop’ against which
vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.”337
The Court then articulated a balancing test between state interests and
federal control. 338 The state’s interest in regulating the on-reservation
conduct of tribal Indians “is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.” 339 The “[m]ore
difficult question[]” is non-Indian activity on Indian reservations.340 There,
Justice Marshall stated that the inquiry begins with an examination of
“relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that
underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from
historical traditions of tribal independence.”341 He also noted that the
“inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or
tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature
of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.” 342 Such a balancing
calculus would be specific to the facts of the case before the Court; the
Court did not delineate the boundaries of these three conflicting spheres of
regulation and jurisdiction.
Using this model, the Court examined the facts and found the federal
regulation of timber on the White Mountain Apache reservation
comprehensive. 343 The Court held that “the federal regulatory scheme is so
pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in this
case.” 344 Thus, there was “no room” for the State’s taxes in this scheme,
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
Id. at 143.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 148.
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and their imposition would interfere with federal regulatory power.345
Arizona failed to “identify a legitimate regulatory interest” in the taxes
beyond “a general desire to raise revenue.”346 The Court could not identify
“a responsibility or service that justifies the assertion of taxes imposed for
on-reservation operations.” 347 The Court held the exercise of state
authority impermissible “where a number of the policies underlying the
federal regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents seek to
impose, and where respondents are unable to justify the taxes except in
terms of a generalized interest in raising revenue.”348
The Court returned to the issue of on-reservation cigarette sales in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma. 349 There, the Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for
the majority, held that “under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the
State may not tax such sales to Indians, but remains free to collect taxes on
sales to nonmembers of the tribe.” 350
The Potawatomi tribe owned and operated a convenience store selling
cigarettes on its lands. 351 In 1987, the Oklahoma Tax Commission served
the tribe with an assessment letter for $2.7 million in taxes that the tribe did
not collect between 1982 and 1986. 352 The tribe filed suit in federal court
to enjoin the assessment.353 The U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma held that Oklahoma “lacked the authority to tax the
on-reservation cigarette sales to tribal members or to tax the Tribe
directly.” 354 However, the State could require the tribe to precollect taxes
for on-reservation sales to non-Indians. 355 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that “Oklahoma lacked the authority to
impose a tax on any sales that occur on the reservation, regardless of
whether they are to tribesmen or nonmembers.” 356 The Supreme Court thus
explained that it “granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict with this
Court’s precedents and to clarify the law of sovereign immunity with
respect to the collection of sales taxes on Indian lands.” 357
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by quoting Chief Justice
Marshall in Cherokee Nation: “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent
nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and
The State argued that tribal sovereign immunity
territories.” 358
“impermissibly burdens the administration of state tax laws” and should be
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
498 U.S. 505 (1991).
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
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restricted to the internal affairs of the tribe. 359 The Court rejected this
argument, citing congressional approval of the immunity doctrine.360 Thus,
the Court was loath “to modify the long-established principle of tribal
sovereign immunity.” 361 However, the doctrine “does not excuse a tribe
from all obligations to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales
taxes.” 362 Thus, the Court held that Moe and Colville governed its
conclusion: the State may tax on-reservation cigarette sales to nonIndians. 363 However, tribal sovereign immunity still barred the State from
suing the tribe to enforce its taxes.364
2. New York Responds: The 1988 Scheme
In the wake of Moe, New York attempted to create a scheme to collect
taxes from on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-Indian purchasers. 365 In
1988, the Department of Taxation and Finance created regulations (1988
Regulations) that adopted a “‘probable demand’ mechanism that limited the
quantity of un-stamped—i.e., ‘untaxed’—cigarettes that wholesalers or
distributors could sell to tribes and tribal retailers.”366 The State would
base this probable demand quota on its own projection or based on
negotiations with tribal leaders. 367 Based on this probable demand, the
State would then issue tax exemption coupons to Indian retailers
representing their monthly allotment.368
3. Attea in State Court
Milhelm Attea Bros., Inc., cigarette wholesalers whose business
primarily relied on Indian trade, immediately challenged the validity of this
scheme. 369 Attea used reasoning similar to that in Warren and Bracker and
contended that federal regulation of Indian traders was so comprehensive as
to preclude the State’s imposition of such regulations. 370 They argued that
federal statutes controlling Indian trade preempted the State’s

359. Id. at 510.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 512 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980)).
363. See id. at 513.
364. Id. at 514.
365. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. 2010).
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 235–36.
369. See id. at 236.
370. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 67–
68 (1994); see White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148 (1980) (“[W]e agree
with petitioners that the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the
additional burdens sought to be imposed in this case.”); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965) (“It was under these comprehensive statutes
and regulations that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs licensed appellant to trade with the
Indians on the Navajo Reservation.”).
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regulations. 371 The Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs authorized the
wholesalers to sell cigarettes to Indians on reservations under 25 U.S.C.
§ 261 (2006). 372 This statute, first enacted in 1876, specified that “[t]he
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and authority to
appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and . . .
specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such
goods shall be sold to the Indians.” 373 The New York Appellate Division
initially agreed with the wholesalers; however, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded the case in light of its decision in
Potawatomi. 374 On July 9, 1992, the Appellate Division held New York’s
tax scheme not preempted by 25 U.S.C. § 261 and thus constitutional.375
The Appellate Division’s decision sparked Seneca Nation retaliation.
Protestors blocked the New York State Thruway passing through Seneca
reservation land. 376 A week after the decision, on July 16, 1992, protesters
burned tires on the I-90 New York State Thruway located on Seneca
territory. 377 The protest initially began as a method to promote awareness
of the hundreds of Seneca jobs at stake in the cigarette commerce. 378 The
protest, however, quickly escalated as some Senecas began to light tires and
even throw debris off of the Thruway running through the Senecas’
Cattaraugus reservation. 379 A violent confrontation ensued in which
Seneca Indians and state troopers were injured.380 Only after the New York
Court of Appeals issued an injunction on July 17 barring the enforcement of
the tax scheme did the demonstration cease.381
In its decision, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished Moe and
Colville, arguing that “those cases involved the regulation of sales to nonIndian consumers” and “this case was significantly different because New
York’s regulations apply to sales by non-Indian wholesalers to reservation

371. See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 236.
372. Attea, 512 U.S. at 67; see 25 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
373. 25 U.S.C. § 261.
374. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y., 585 N.Y.S.2d
847, 849 (App. Div. 1992), rev’d, 615 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1993), rev’d, 502 U.S. 1053 (1992).
375. Id.
376. Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 137, 158 (2006).
377. Senecas Clash With Police Over Tax Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/17/nyregion/senecas-clash-with-police-over-taxruling.html?src=pm [hereinafter Senecas Clash].
378. Porter, supra note 376, at 159.
379. Id.; Senecas Clash, supra note 377.
380. Porter, supra note 376, at 159.
381. Lindsey Gruson, New Betrayal, Senecas Say, and New Rage, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/18/nyregion/new-betrayal-senecas-say-and-newrage.html?scp=1&sq=seneca&st=nyt; Lindsey Gruson, Senecas Dismantle Roadblocks After
Claiming
Victory
on
Tax,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
19,
1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/19/nyregion/senecas-dismantle-roadblocks-after-claimingvictory-on-tax.html?src=pm; see James Dao, Ruling Scuttles Plan To Collect Taxes on
Reservation
Sales,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/11/nyregion/ruling-scuttles-plan-to-collect-taxes-onreservation-sales.html?scp=8&sq=%22attea%22&st=nyt.
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Indians.” 382 The Court of Appeals, using Warren, concluded the federal
regulations embodied in 25 U.S.C. § 261 “deprived the States of all power
to impose regulatory burdens on licensed Indian traders.”383 The Warren
Court found these regulations “apparently all-inclusive” and “would seem
in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for
state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.” 384 The Supreme
Court disagreed with this interpretation. 385
B. Attea in the Supreme Court
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in Attea deciding
whether New York’s regulations were “pre-empted by federal statutes
governing trade with Indians,” namely 25 U.S.C. § 261. 386 The Court
reiterated Moe, stating that “[b]ecause New York lacks authority to tax
cigarettes sold to tribal members for their own consumption cigarettes to be
consumed on the reservation by enrolled tribal members are tax exempt and
The New York Taxation Department
need not be stamped.” 387
(Department) “determined that a large volume of unstamped cigarettes was
being purchased by non-Indians from reservation retailers.” 388 To prevent
nonexempt purchasers from escaping taxation, “the regulations limit the
quantity of untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers may sell to tribes and tribal
retailers.” 389
The regulations mandated two ways to develop and enforce such
limitations: agreements between the State and the tribe or, “[i]n the absence
of such an agreement . . . the Department itself limits the permitted quantity
of untaxed cigarettes based on the ‘probable demand’ of tax-exempt Indian
consumers.” 390 The Department would calculate “probable demand” by
either relying on tribal evidence if the tribe regulates or controls onreservation cigarette sales or through its own calculus. 391 “Each sale of
untaxed cigarettes by a wholesaler to a tribe or reservation retailer must be
approved by the Department . . . . Retailers are sent ‘Tax Exemption
Coupons’ entitling them to their monthly allotment of tax-exempt
cigarettes.” 392 The Department also had the authority to “withhold
approval of deliveries to tribes or retailers” who violate the regulations “and

382. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 68
(1994).
383. Id.
384. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
385. Attea, 512 U.S. at 69.
386. Attea, 512 U.S. at 64, 68.
387. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
388. Id. at 64–65.
389. Id. at 65.
390. Id. at 65–66.
391. Id. at 66.
392. Id.
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may cancel the exemption certificates of noncomplying tribes or
retailers.” 393
Justice Stevens first noted that the Court’s opinion was based on a facial
challenge to the New York scheme. 394 Thus, the Court made important
assumptions. It assumed “the allocations for each reservation will be
sufficiently generous to satisfy the legitimate demands of those reservation
Indians who smoke cigarettes.” 395 The Court noted it confined its decision
“to those alleged defects that inhere in the regulations as written.” 396
Although the effects of the scheme “may be relevant . . . this case does not
require us to assess for all purposes each feature of New York’s tax
enforcement scheme that might affect tribal self-government or federal
authority over Indian affairs.” 397 The Court thus was hesitant to expand its
holding beyond “the narrower question whether the New York scheme is
inconsistent with [section 261].” 398
The Court stated that later cases such as Moe limited the broad language
of Warren, which stated that section 261 preempted state interference.399
The tax in Moe “fell upon a class—non-Indians—whom the State had
power to tax.” 400 The Court also reiterated its findings in Colville, namely
that “the Tribes had failed to meet their burden of showing that the
recordkeeping requirements . . . were ‘not reasonably necessary as a means
of preventing fraudulent transactions.’” 401
After reviewing this line of antecedent questions, the Court undertook to
balance the state’s interest in regulating the activities of the people within
its borders and the tribal autonomy of Indian tribes living on
reservations. 402 The Court rearticulated its analysis in Bracker: this is a
conflict whose resolution does not depend on rigid concepts but instead a
particularized inquiry into the facts. 403 Thus, in addition to Justice
Stevens’s initial warning that the Court’s decision would be limited to a
facial challenge of the statutes as written, the Court further limited its
holding by repeating that its inquiry was specific to the factual challenge in
question.
The Court, following its precedent, reasoned that the state’s “valid
interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes . . . leaves more room for
state regulation than in others.” 404 Court precedent “decided that States
may impose on reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to

393. Id. at 66–67.
394. Id. at 69.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 70.
399. See id. at 71.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 72 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160 (1980)).
402. See id. at 73.
403. See id.
404. Id.
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the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians.” 405 Thus, “[25 U.S.C. § 261
does] not bar the States from imposing reasonable regulatory burdens upon
Indian traders.” 406 The Court held that “Indian traders are not wholly
immune from state regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment
or collection of lawful state taxes.”407
Next, the Court assessed the New York Court of Appeals’s alternative
holding: even if Indian traders may be burdened by state regulations, the
regulations at issue are excessively burdensome. 408 The respondents
objected to the New York scheme’s “probable demand” calculations. 409
The Court replied: “While the possibility of an inadequate quota may
provide the basis for a future challenge to the application of the regulations,
we are unwilling to assume, in the absence of any such showing by
respondents, that New York will underestimate the legitimate demand for
tax-free cigarettes.” 410
The Court thus did not determine whether such mechanisms are always
constitutional. Indeed, by admitting possible future problems with the
scheme’s application, the Court abstained from creating a broad framework
for the State, and instead decided a narrow, fact-specific, facial challenge.
The Court ruled that the “procedure should not prove unduly burdensome
absent wrongful withholding or delay of approval—problems that can be
addressed if and when they arise.” 411 The Court assessed the New York
scheme’s precollection requirement similarly: “Again assuming that the
‘probable demand’ calculations leave ample room for legitimately taxexempt sales, the precollection regime will not require prepayment of any
tax to which New York is not entitled.” 412 The Court also did not assume
“the Department would refuse certification to any federally authorized
trader or stultify tribal economies by refusing certification to new
reservation retailers.” 413 It accepted the State’s assurances that such
approval is “virtually automatic.”414
The U.S. Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief asking for the
Court to affirm the decision of the New York Court of Appeals. 415 The
United States opposed the scheme’s creation of “trade territories” and the
allocation of “each reservation’s overall quota among its retail outlets.”416
The Court shared these concerns, warning that “[d]epending upon how they
are applied in particular circumstances, these provisions may present
significant problems to be addressed in some future proceeding.” 417 The
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
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Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Court recommended that “[a]greements between the Department and
individual tribes might avoid or resolve problems that are now purely
hypothetical.” 418 With this admonition and appeal for an agreement
between the parties, the Court concluded that the scheme did not facially
violate § 261. 419
1. A Hollow Victory: Post-Attea Conflict and Forbearance
Although hailed as a “major victory” for the state of New York, 420 nearly
two decades of conflict and confusion post-Attea demonstrate its failure to
create a resolution to New York’s enforcement problem. After the decision,
the Department planned to begin collection of taxes, however, enforcement
of the regulations was delayed to “finalize the plan’s technical details.”421
The Department initiated negotiations with the tribes, but ultimately
failed. 422 In December 1995, Tax Commissioner Michael Urbach stated
that New York intended to enforce the tax scheme in February 1996 upon
the expiration of older tax regulations.423 By late February 1996, the
Department announced that enforcement of the tax scheme would occur,
beginning on July 5, 1996. 424 Tribal leaders responded with a summit
attended by over 200 Indian officials, stating that tribes intended to fight the
State’s enforcement plan. 425 Hundreds of Native Americans protested on
May 14, 1996 at the New York State Capitol in Albany, and Governor

418. Id.
419. See id. at 77–78.
420. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, New York Sees Tax Windfall in Indian Sales, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/14/nyregion/new-york-sees-taxwinfall-in-indian-sales.html?scp=11&sq=%22attea%22&st=nyt.
421. See N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1998)
(holding that New York’s forbearance policy did not constitute a racial classification subject
to strict scrutiny against non-Indian convenience store owners); Michel P. Cassier & Andrew
B. Sabol, State Taxation, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 729, 766 (1999) (mentioning implementation
of the regulations was suspended pending the result of the Urbach litigation). The New
York Court of Appeals remanded Urbach to the New York Supreme Court in Albany
County, which determined that the New York Taxation and Finance Department’s
(Department) decision not to enforce the taxes did not violate equal protection. See N.Y.
Ass’n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 694 N.Y.S.2d 885, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“[T]he
unique nature of Indian nations and the resulting complexities compels this Court to
conclude that the determinations of the Respondents were eminently reasonable in all
respects.”), aff’d, 712 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (App. Div. 2000) (concluding “there is indeed a
rational basis for respondents’ indefinite forbearance”).
422. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 237 (N.Y. 2010); see
also Jon R. Sorensen, Bowen Mulling Gas, Cigarette Taxes; Share May Go to State,
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 8, 1996), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-22822731.html
(describing hopeful meetings between Governor George Pataki and Seneca Nation President
Dennis J. Bowen where the Seneca mentioned the possibility of levying tribal taxes on
cigarettes in which the state would collect a percentage).
423. Jon R. Sorensen, Taxes on Reservation Sales Still up in Air, BUFFALO NEWS (Dec.
19, 1995), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-22773131.html.
424. Jon R. Sorensen, State to Collect Levies on Reservation-Bound Cigarettes, Gas,
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 21, 1996), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-22836598.html.
425. Susan Schulman, Leaders Vow To Fight Proposed Tax on Gasoline, Cigarettes,
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 25, 1996), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-22837345.html.
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George Pataki lifted the July enforcement deadline. 426 In April 1997, after
a stalemate between the negotiating tribes and the State, Governor Pataki
announced an interim compromise agreement where reservations would
impose their own taxes on cigarettes which would be lower than New York
State taxes. 427 The Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Cayuga Nations
agreed to the compromise. 428 However, the four tribes with the largest
share of the reservation cigarette trade, the Senecas, the St. Regis Mohawk,
the Shinnecock, and the Poospatuck refused to agree. 429 The Department
ordered all shipments of cigarettes to the disagreeing tribes to cease and
arrested two truck drivers on felony violations of the tax regulations.430
The Seneca Nation responded to the State’s aggressive enforcement with
a repetition of its 1992 blockade. The Senecas shut down a thirty mile
stretch of the New York Thruway passing through its Cattaraugus
reservation on April 21, 1997. 431 State troopers clashed with the protesters,
injuring individuals on both sides.432 The State agreed to remove its
troopers from the Seneca reservation, and the Senecas agreed to further
negotiations. 433 However, the talks broke down after only two days. 434 On
May 22, 1997, Governor Pataki announced that the State would no longer
attempt to enforce the tax scheme and instead announced a permanent
forbearance policy against the enforcement of the tax. 435 The New York
legislature repealed the never-implemented 1988 Regulations in April
1998. 436
Despite the policy of forbearance declared by the Governor and affirmed
by the Department, in 2003 the New York legislature adopted Tax Law
471-e directing the Department to adopt regulations to tax cigarettes sold on
reservations to non-Indians. 437 The Department drafted, but never adopted
regulations. 438
In 2005, the legislature amended 471-e to incorporate the Department’s
proposed regulations, stating: “non-Indians making cigarette purchases on
an Indian reservation shall not be exempt from paying the cigarette tax

426. Karen L. Folster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, or an Equal Protection Violation?:
New York’s Failure To Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 ALB. L. REV. 697, 705
(1998).
427. Id. at 706.
428. Id. at 706 n.82.
429. See Raymond Hernandez, In a Shift, New York Won’t Try To Tax Sales on Indian
Lands, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/23/nyregion/in-ashift-new-york-won-t-try-to-tax-sales-on-indian-lands.html.
430. Folster, supra note 426, at 707.
431. William Glaberson, Trying To Unite Fractured Tribe While Fighting State over
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/22/nyregion/trying-tounite-fractured-tribe-while-fighting-state-over taxes.html?scp=1&sq=seneca&st=nyt.
432. Id.
433. Folster, supra note 426, at 708.
434. Id.
435. Hernandez, supra note 429.
436. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 237 (N.Y. 2010).
437. 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 579 (McKinney).
438. See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 238.
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when purchasing cigarettes within this state.”439 The 2005 scheme also
adopted a probable demand calculus and coupon system similar to the 1988
Regulations. 440 The cigarette wholesaler must pay the sales tax on all
cigarettes and then use the coupon for a refund. After the passage of these
amendments, the Department declined to make the probable demand
calculations or proper implementation rules necessary to enforce them and
instead continued the forbearance policy. 441
In response to the State’s threatened enforcement despite the
Department’s forbearance policy, a tribal retailer initiated a declaratory
judgment action against the enforcement of the 471-e amendments. 442 The
Appellate Division concluded that such provisions would only become
effective when “[a]t a minimum, the actions, rules and regulations
necessary for the implementation of the statutory scheme include the
issuance of Indian tax exemption coupons.” 443 The court therefore enjoined
the enforcement of 471-e. 444
Thus, when the Court of Appeals decided Cayuga Indian Nation of New
York v. Gould 445 in May 2010, there was “no enforceable statutory or
regulatory scheme specifically addressing the calculation or collection of
taxes arising from the on-reservation retail sale of cigarettes.” There, the
court ruled that “[i]n the absence of a methodology developed by the State
that respects the federally protected right to sell untaxed cigarettes to
members of the Nation while at the same time providing for the calculation
and collection of the tax relating to retail sales to non-Indian consumers”
taxes could not be collected on reservation cigarette sales to non-Indians.446
The court reiterated that New York should create a “specialized
mechanism” for taxation while proceeding with sensitivity and respect
towards Native American tribes. 447
2. Crisis Reignites: The 2010 Scheme
While the Court of Appeals considered the case in Cayuga, the
Department revoked its previous policy of forbearance. 448 On June 21,
2010, the State Legislature enacted amendments to the tax law, including
provisions that required all cigarettes sold on Indian reservations in New
York to bear a New York tax stamp even if those cigarettes are destined for
tax-exempt sales. 449 It also created an optional tax exemption coupon
439. See 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 461 (McKinney).
440. Id.
441. See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 239.
442. Day Wholesale, Inc. v. State, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (App. Div. 2008).
443. Id. at 810.
444. See id. at 812.
445. 930 N.E.2d, 930 N.E.2d 233, 239–49 (N.Y. 2010).
446. Id. at 253.
447. See id. at 254.
448. Memorandum of Law in Support of Appellants’ Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 10, Day Wholesale, Inc. v.
State, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 2008) (No. 2006/7669).
449. Id. at 11.
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system. 450 The Department adopted an emergency rule on June 22, 2010 to
enforce these amendments. 451 The Department claimed the system satisfied
the requirements set forth by Cayuga and moved to lift the preliminary
injunction still in place from the 2008 Day Wholesale litigation. 452 So far
the Appellate Division has not agreed with the State. 453
On October 14, 2010, Judge Richard Arcara of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York granted a stay of enforcement of the 2010
scheme against the Seneca Nation and the Cayuga Nation pending appeal to
the Second Circuit. 454 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction.455 However, the court granted plaintiffs a stay
pending the Second Circuit’s review of their motion.456 The court found
that the Seneca Nation will suffer “irreparable injury absent a stay . . . that
cannot be remedied by damages.” 457 The court noted that “[a]pproximately
3,000 people are currently employed by the Seneca Nation’s 172 tobacco
retailers” and the cigarette sales profits “represent virtually the only source
of revenue for the [Cayuga] Nation.” 458 Judge Arcara thus concluded that
“[t]he potential loss of an entire economy that currently supports many of
each Nation’s members and services is a harm that cannot be measured by
monetary damages alone.” 459 If the new tax scheme were to go into effect
immediately and the Second Circuit later decided it was constitutionally
impermissible, “it may be too late to undo the harm suffered by the
Nations’ existing tobacco businesses in the interim.” 460
The court also found that New York State will not “suffer substantial
injury if the stay is issued.” 461 The court noted the State’s “dramatic shift”
from forbearance to enforcement after the State’s recent budgetary crisis
and concluded, “the Court does not believe that the minimal, additional
delay pending appeal will cause substantial injury, particularly when
weighed against the potential irreparable harm to the Nations’ tobacco
economies.” 462
Although in denying the Seneca Nation’s motion for a preliminary
injunction the court necessarily found that the Nations “failed to
demonstrate a substantial possibility of success on appeal. . . . [the court
acknowledged that it could not] be said that there is no possibility of
success on appeal.” 463 The court found that aspects of the new scheme had
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 12.
453. See Herbeck & Besecker, supra note 8.
454. See Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, No. 10-CV-687A, 2010 WL 4027796
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010).
455. See id. at *2.
456. See id.
457. Id. at *4.
458. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
459. Id.
460. Id. at *6.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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not been authorized by Supreme Court precedent.464 It further noted that
“[i]t remains an open question as to whether the Second Circuit will agree
with this Court’s determination that the prior approval system imposes only
a minimal burden” and that the “Nations have raised serious legal questions
going to the merits of their claims.” 465
The court lastly found a stay to be in the public interest. 466 Because the
State and the Indian tribes “have been at odds over this issue for decades”
and because “both sides publicly spoke about the potential for violence,”
the court found a stay would retain the status quo until the Seneca Nation’s
arguments were fully considered. 467 The Second Circuit denied the State’s
motion to lift the District Court’s stay on December 9, 2010. 468
C. A Parallel Path: The Example of Washington State
While the conflict between the Indian tribes and the State of New York
continues in the courts, Washington State confronted a similar problem
after the Supreme Court ruled in its favor in Colville. 469 The State Revenue
Department and the tribes were at an impasse despite Colville, which
became a “hollow victory” for the state, offering little guidance for a
solution. 470 Thus, the State embarked on a different path from that of New
York:
government-to-government talks leading to agreements and
eventually legislation effectively ending the tribal-state conflict over the
collection of cigarette taxes.
On August 4, 1989, Washington Governor Booth Gardner and leaders of
Washington State Indian tribes signed a historic agreement entitled the
“Centennial Accord.” (Accord) 471 The “mutual goals” of the parties were
to improve state-tribal relations and provide a “framework for that
government-to-government relationship and implementation procedures to
assure execution of that relationship.” 472 The Accord established annual
meetings to maintain a continuing dialogue between the parties473 and
expressed mutual respect for the sovereignty of each party. 474 The Accord

464. See id.
465. Id. at *7.
466. See id.
467. Id.
468. Unkechauge Indian Nation, St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Paterson, No. 10-4598-cv
(2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2010) (order denying motion to lift stay).
469. See LESLIE CUSHMAN, DEPUTY DIR., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF REVENUE, TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY: WHY IT SHOULD MATTER TO YOU 28 (Aug. 29, 2007) (presentation outlining
the cigarette tax enforcement crisis in Washington State and how the tribes and the
Washington State Department of Revenue crafted a sustainable solution together).
470. Id. at 30.
471. Centennial Accord Between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Washington
State and the State of Washington, August 4, 1989, available at
www.goia.wa.gov/Government-to-Government/Data/CentennialAccord.htm
[hereinafter
Centennial Accord].
472. Id. § I.
473. See id. § IV.
474. See id. § V.
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marked an important first step in creating a relationship of trust between the
State Revenue Department and the tribes.
In 2001, the Washington legislature permitted the governor to enter into
compacts with Indian tribes over the taxation of cigarettes.475 Certain
Indian tribes were eligible for such pacts. 476 The legislation allowed tribes
to issue their own taxes on cigarettes; however, such taxes must equal the
State taxes and revenue from such taxes must go to essential reservation
government services. 477 The legislation was successful: by 2005, 19 out of
29 eligible tribes entered into such compacts. 478 As a result of these
compacts, tribal smokeshops in Washington State sell taxed and stamped
cigarettes and use state-licensed wholesalers. 479 According to Leslie
Cushman, former Deputy Director of Washington’s Department of
Revenue, the resulting tribal tax arrangements were “[s]uccessful beyond
[the Department’s] wildest dreams!” 480
In late 1999, Washington State affirmed the commitments made in the
Centennial Accord with the Millennium Agreement. At the Tribal and
State Leaders’ Summit in November 1999, Indian nations and Washington
signed this agreement. 481 The tribes and state officials committed to
strengthening government-to-government communications and promoting
awareness of tribal sovereignty. 482 The parties agreed to continue to work
together to address areas of mutual concern and to further institutionalize
their relationship through legislation.483
Twenty years after the Centennial Accord and ten years after the
Millennium Agreement, Washington State has successfully endeavored to
resolve its conflict with the Indian tribes through roundtable discussions
and cigarette compact negotiations. Both parties have resolved to create a
relationship where trust can follow and lasting solutions can be forged. 484
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL: GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TAX
COMPACTS
The previous parts of this Note have described an intricate and seemingly
intractable conflict. This part, however, proposes a solution which begins
with a seemingly modest overture of goodwill and partnership. Although
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.450 (2010).
See id. § 43.06.460.
See id. § 43.06.455(3).
See CUSHMAN, supra note 469, at 31.
See LESLIE CUSHMAN, DEPUTY DIR., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF REVENUE,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS EXERCISING THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
RELATIONSHIP: THE WASHINGTON STATE TAXATION EXPERIENCE 28 (Apr. 2006).
480. Id.
481. See Press Release, Governors Office of Indian Affairs, Institutionalizing the
Government-to-Government Relationship in Preparation for the New Millennium (Nov. 3,
1999),
available
at
http://www.goia.wa.gov/Government-to-Government/Data/
agreement.htm.
482. See id.
483. See id.
484. See Jerry Cornfield, 1989 Pact Keeps State and Tribes Talking, HERALD NET (June
28, 2009), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20090628/NEWS01/706289848/-1/RSS02.
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such suggestions may seem simplistic, this Note’s discussion thus far has
demonstrated that such actions have been sorely lacking in New York State.
Whereas in Washington State, tribes and state officials are “content to
discuss persisting disputes around a table and not debate them through
lawyers in a courtroom,” 485 in New York, tribal-state disputes surrounding
the enforcement of the state tax scheme continue. Both Washington and
New York received Supreme Court decisions facially approving each tax
scheme without providing any framework for enforcement or tribal
negotiations. Both states found enforcement of these tax schemes to be
problematic. New York responded by announcing a policy of forbearance;
Washington took affirmative steps to create a lasting protocol of mutual
respect where conflict resolution can actively take place. Indeed, by the
1990s, New York remained the only state that had not entered into tax
agreements with its Indian tribes. 486 New York is suffering from its
inaction, but it too can create a solution if it follows Washington’s example.
New York and the Seneca Nation of Indians should engage in governmentto-government negotiations to solve this cigarette crisis.
After centuries of mutual distrust, New York must assure the Senecas
that their treaties and tribal sovereignty will be protected and respected by
the State. The Senecas have not forgotten the historical, “predatory” efforts
of the State to infringe their treaty rights.487 Without a court ruling
definitively determining the merits of these treaty rights with regard to this
controversy, 488 the State must proceed cognizant of the Seneca
interpretation and respectful of their position. The State must display its
good faith by making the first step towards compromise.
The Senecas, on the other hand must put aside threats of tribal unrest489
and make a unilateral commitment to compromise. Compromise is
certainly in the best interest of the tribes. Ongoing litigation is extremely
costly to the already fragile tribal economies and an unsustainable model
for resolution of the controversy. The manifest conflict and confusion
following a deceptively straightforward U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Attea
demonstrates that courts have not provided a definitive solution.490
Furthermore, pursuing out-of-court solutions avoids the zero-sum result of
adversarial litigation. The Senecas simply have too much at stake to follow
such a course of action. 491
As Governor Andrew Cuomo forms his gubernatorial administration’s
Indian policy, he should consider mirroring Washington State Governor
Gardner’s Centennial Accord. 492 Such an accord provides a framework
from which compacts can be negotiated. 493 It also provides a baseline
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
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recognition of the respective sovereignties of each party in the form of a
signed accord. 494 It thus institutionalizes the mutual respect embodied in a
relationship between governments. 495
The Governor should meet
personally with tribal leaders and establish a pattern of annual meetings to
maintain a dialogue. Such meetings demonstrate that the State respects
tribal leadership as a co-partner in the compromise process and opens a
venue for meaningful discussion absent the adversarial posturing of
litigation. Furthermore, the establishment of annual meetings shows both
sides are actually committing to a tribal-state relationship.
Once the parties have created an open dialogue, the State can enter into
cigarette compacts with each tribe similar to those in Washington.496
Individualized compacts can specifically address the needs of particular
tribes. For example, the solution that fits the Senecas’ situation may not
function as well for the St. Regis Mohawk. Individualized compacts also
leave no ambiguities over whether certain provisions apply to certain tribes.
The tax department should also develop internal best practices for
creating cigarette tax compromises.497 In Washington, “Department of
Revenue staff travel[ed] throughout the state” meeting tribal leaders.498
After these meetings, the department began to view tribal governments as
partners in tax administration. 499 The tax department of New York should
similarly shift its view of Indian governments from adversaries to partners.
This recognition would give the State more flexibility to compromise.
New York may then be willing to create a solution where tribal, rather than
state taxes are levied on reservation sales to non-Indians, like in
Washington. 500 Such a solution would benefit both sides. From the State’s
perspective, taxes would still be levied on cigarettes sold on reservations to
non-Indians. 501 From the tribe’s perspective, revenue would go to essential
tribal government services. 502 The State would still not collect revenue for
itself; however, this may be solved by compacting for a certain percentage
of the tax revenue. Similarly, the tribe might compact for a tax rate lower
than that of the State to preserve its economy.
Additionally, the New York legislature must avoid the policy disconnect
between the executive branch and the legislative branch that occurred in
2003. 503 The legislature should support any accords or agreements the
Governor makes with the tribes and enact legislation similar to the
Washington model. 504 Such legislation puts any tribal-state negotiations on
firm footing by enacting the results into law. It is in the best interest of
494.
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New York State to act uniformly among its branches and agencies.
Otherwise, any solution would be impermissibly ephemeral, subject to the
political vicissitudes of New York’s branches of government. Again, the
Washington State Legislature understood this when enacting its legislation
in 2001. 505 It would be wise for New York to do the same.
The success of Washington State in solving its similar situation
demonstrates that a solution benefiting both parties is possible. Both parties
can easily begin this process through talking against a background of
mutual respect. The State must cease to view the tribes as an enemy to its
own interests. The tribes must similarly begin to view the State as its
partner in good faith. Nothing can undo the long history of destruction,
betrayal, and distrust experienced by the Seneca Nation of Indians and their
fellow Native Americans. However, the failure of both parties to create a
solution to this conflict is certainly not irreversible.
CONCLUSION
State taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indians on reservation land has
proven a modern battleground where the respective spheres of the state, the
tribes, and the federal government uncomfortably collide. In New York
State, these chaffing jurisdictions have produced a conflict spanning
decades with roots centuries deep. However, this conflict does not need to
last any further into the twenty-first century. New York State and the
Seneca Nation of Indians can create a lasting solution if they engage in
government-to-government negotiations. New York must initiate a tribalstate relationship based on mutual respect and recognition and sensitivity to
the history and treaty rights of the Seneca Nation. The State must view the
Senecas as co-partners in tax administration, rather than adversaries bent on
evasion. Such a shift opens the door to flexible, individualized compacts
where the zero-sum result of costly litigation is set aside for more
permanent solutions based on an investment in a lasting relationship with
the tribe. Only when the parties create such a fair, credible, and effective
solution will this conflict recede into the annals of history.

505. See supra note 475 and accompanying text.

